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ETIs: A SCHEME FOR THE RESCUE OF CITY
AND COUNTRY WITH PENSION FUNDS
Alvin D. Luriet
I. INTRODUCTION
Most observers of Washington would not recognize the term "eco-
nomically targeted investment" ("ETI"). ETI is basically a scheme for
using the funds of both public and private pensions to invest in, say,
community projects like building bridges. But despite the term's obscu-
rity, a curious spectacle unfolded on Capitol Hill last year. The House of
Representatives passed an unusual bill1 to bar the Department of Labor
(DOL) from guiding pension fund managers in considering these
investments.
The House of Representatives was responding to a brief announce-
ment by DOL2 which was designed to alleviate apprehension among
pension plan trustees concerned about the contamination that a motive
outside plan participants' benefits would cause. In IB 94-1, DOL as-
serted that it wanted only to clarify the conditions under which pension
plan fiduciaries could engage in ETIs.
This article will prove that ETIs pose no greater problem than many
other conventional pension investments, such as junk bonds and deriva-
tives. Further, this article will argue that the Labor Department acted
properly to enhance the soundness of pension funds and the security of
plan participants' pensions. To be sure, DOL's guidance will certainly
benefit pension participants more than the absence of any guidance.
DOL's motives for making the announcement may stem from the
political objectives of the Clinton Administration to facilitate and en-
courage the use of pension funds to advance social agendas. The motive
does not automatically tarnish DOL's endeavors, but it was enough for
the House of Representatives to issue a statement that it was inappropri-
t Alvin D. Lurie is the Chairman of the New York State Bar Association's Special
Committee on Pension Simplification. Mr. Lurie was the first person appointed to the position
of Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Employee Plans & Exempt Organizations).
He is a former consultant to the New York State Tax Commission and a former Co-Editor-in-
Chief of the Cornell Law Quarterly.
1 H.R. 1594, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
2 Dept. of Labor [hereinafter DOL] Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 [hereinafter IB 94-1],In-
terpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 59 Fed.
Reg. 32,606 (1994) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).
316 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
ate for DOL - the principal enforcer of pension law - to promote or
encourage ETIs.
II. TERMS OF THE DEBATE
ETIs can do vast good for society, but they also have the potential to
wreak disaster on pensions. Thus, these investments ignite strong rheto-
ric from both their supporters and detractors. The Ford Foundation re-
ported in a recent study that:
[t]he subject of ETIs remains very controversial. Among
other things, the controversy stems from: perceived con-
flicts with fiduciary duty; a conflict with generally ac-
cepted investment principles such as diversification; a
confusion about the definition of the term; and a concern
that demands for ETIs will infringe on a fund's
independence. 3
The Ford Foundation attempted to overcome the problem of defining
ETIs with a definition of its own: ETIs are "designed to produce a com-
petitive rate of return commensurate with risk, as well as to create collat-
eral economic benefits for a targeted geographic area, group of people or
sector of the economy." 4 But we may need a brand new term rather than
just a better definition. Even the same initials would work: "ETI" can
stand for "extraterrestrial investments" (as in investments outside the
normal terrain of pension trustees.) They can also stand for "TOP," an
acronym for 'The Other Path" (as in alternative investment routes.)
Trustees could then 'Top up" the plan, and the phrase would convey an
affirmative investment strategy; but, unlike the phrase now in use, it
would not also convey the baggage of affirmative action.
In the face of increasing unemployment, Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich has urged pension investors to look for something more than just
the dollar rate of return. When he met with a major trade group which
represents large corporate and public pension funds, Mr. Reich argued
that "over-reliance on balance-sheet ratios-for instance, return on capi-
tal, assets and invested capital - ignores a human dimension that can
affect long-term corporate performance." 5 Listeners reminded Secretary
Reich that, while they were willing to look at nonfinancial indicators,
such data could only be a supplement to - not a substitute for - basic
financial analysis.
3 REPORT OF INSTITUTE FOR FIDUCIARY EDUCATION, ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVEST-
MENTS - A REFERENCE FOR PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS, Executive Summary, Ford Foundation,
June, 1993 [hereinafter Ford Report].
4 Id. at 5
5 See BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Mar. 29, 1993.
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Another concern of the Clinton Administration is that important
business segments, which traditional providers of capital underserve, are
finding it difficult to acquire investment capital. Funds, after all, are in-
creasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, which
favor publicly-traded securities investments in main-line projects.
A DOL advisory group has studied ways for these groups to gain
access to pension funds, inasmuch as increasing share of long-term sav-
ings is flowing into the pension system at the very time that banks, which
operate under new stringent capital requirements, have withdrawn almost
entirely from secondary investment programs. 6 The DOL advisory body
concluded that many sound investments exist in areas that pension funds
do not usually target, and that, by investing in projects which are of local
or occupational interest to a pension fund's participants, the funds can
create a "primary benefit from competitive financial returns and a collat-
eral benefit from the creation of jobs, wealth, and other local economic
ripple effects." 7
On the other hand, one commentator has characterized ETIs as
"hardly any less larcenous than the sweetheart loans the mob took from
the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund."8
Even a group of pastors from the Evangelical Lutheran Church of
America refused to use their pension money for the public good. Thirty
pastors sued the parent body and its pension board for violation of fiduci-
ary duties by allegedly basing pension investments on a social agenda
rather than on the best financial interests of pension participants. 9
People resist ETIs because they believe that the investments are
concessionary and involve some sacrifice of return.10 The Ford study
found that the most frequent reason public systems give for not investing
in ETIs was the belief that doing so conflicted with the pension fund's
6 See WoRx GROUP ON PENSION INVESTMENTS OF ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PENSION,
WELFARE & BEnEIrr PLANS OF DOL, ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVrSTMENT - AN ERISA
POLICY REI Ew (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter DOL ADVISORY REPORT].
7 Id. at Executive Summary.
8 David Andrew Price, Pensions Ripe for Democrats Plucking, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
1993, at A10.
9 Basich v. Board of Pensioners, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 540 N.W.2d
82 (Minn. App. 1995) (Establishment Clause prevents state courts from determining whether
ELCA broke contract with its clergy by directing its pension board to base its investments on
moral and social concerns; Freedom of Conscience Clause in Minnesota Constitution, which
bars government action burdening exercise of religious beliefs, does not give court
jurisdiction).
10 See also Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically
Targeted Investments, 1B 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BEamE.EY J.
EMPLOYMENr & LAB. L. 333 (1995) [hereinafter Phone DOLl; John H. Langbein, Social In-
vesting of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile and Illegal, in
DISIN ESTMENT - Is rr LEGAL? Is I MORAL? Is IT PRODUCrIvE? (1985) [hereinafter
DISINVESTMNT].
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fiduciary duty. Indeed, Professor Edward Zelinsky argues that even ac-
knowledging that collateral factors enter into the fiduciary's Buy decision
taints the transaction; it automatically runs afoul of fundamental ERISA
principles such as interest sole, prudence, and exclusive benefits." The
principle of exclusive benefit, for example, runs through all the pension
regulatory statutes, and it requires the formation, management, and main-
tenance of pension plans "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits
to participants."' 2 Thus, Professor Zelinsky argues that trustees' admit-
ting or pursuing any other purpose - however praiseworthy - simply
violates the principle.
But it is an unworkable standard to permit an investment to inciden-
tally benefit some "externality" while simultaneously forbidding a trustee
from admitting that this social benefit influenced his action. The fiduci-
ary would then be in the awkward position of choosing between disin-
genuous denial or candid confession.
Moreover, ETIs must satisfy the standards of prudence, diligence,
skill, and risk-adjusted market return - standards which apply to every
kind of pension investment. Further, the plan fiduciaries must avoid self-
dealing and other prohibited transactions. In fact, DOL's announcement
in no way approves anything less for an ETI; DOL warns that it will not
encourage any derogation or subordination of the plan's interests, and the
plan fiduciary who fails to observe these strictures does so at its extreme
peril.
IB 94-1 is a response to the general concern among pension trustees
that "even minimal evidence that something other than participant wel-
fare has motivated trustee behavior triggers the standard's protections." 1 3
That concern informs the recent report of the Employee Benefits Com-
mittee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York which urges
"further clarification from the DOL ... [to] reduce the likelihood that
ERISA fiduciaries will reject prudent ETIs solely because of uncertainty
in the law."' 4
Because great confusion surrounds the issue of "social" investing
a term which includes not just subsidized investments, but even those
investments that also satisfy the market's requirements for a competitive,
risk-adjusted return - plan trustees would like to know DOL's official
position on the subject. This knowledge is valuable even for the cautious
11 See Phone DOL, supra note 10.
12 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended primarily in 29 U.S.C. 1001-1114 (1982 & Supp. 1988)); I.R.C.
§ 401(a) (1990); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a).
13 Phone DOL, supra note 10, at 343-44.
14 Comm. ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, Report of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, in THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE Crry OF NEw YORK 578 (June 1995)
[hereinafter ABC REPORT].
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fiduciary, who might want assurances from the judiciary or counsel.
Nevertheless, it helps to have the government - or, at least, the Labor
Department, which no doubt acts with the tacit approval of the White
House - bring the "incidental benefit" issue out of the closet.
For DOL to have acknowledged the legitimacy of incidental benefit
considerations is valuable; but acknowledging that the exclusive benefit
rule does not prevent the trustee's investment decisions from serving in-
terests other than the participants' would be more so. Even Professors
Fischel and Langbein, who certainly do not support ETIs, have basically
said that there should be some "give" in the exclusive benefit doctrine so
that courts do not need to resort to the fiction of "incidental benefits" to
get around its proscription. 15
Make no mistake, introducing collateral considerations into the in-
vestment equation invites improper influences and attracts administrative
and even judicial remedies: fiduciary penalties and injunctions, civil and
criminal remedies, and, sometimes, plan "disqualification."' 16 But these
legal remedies also serve as adequate counterbalance.
I. AN OLD NEW IDEA
The concept of the ETI has been around for a long time. The Clin-
ton Administration, however, fueled public interest when it placed ETIs
under the spotlight. News accounts from the time of the President's in-
auguration identified - among the legislative initiatives Clinton's transi-
tion team was drafting for sparking the lagging economic recovery - a
proposal to create incentives for pension funds to buy bonds financing
public works and environmental projects. Such suggestions, in fact, date
back to the 1991 presidential campaign. Diverse figures such as the Rev-
erend Jesse Jackson, investment banker Felix Rohatyin, and even Clinton
himself advocated ETIs. Indeed, at least three of the new Cabinet ap-
pointees into HUD, Labor, and Transportation in their confirmation hear-
ings also endorsed tapping pension funds for "the public interest."
The idea has caught fire again recently, and cynics will say that the
current focus on the pension funds is the Willie Sutton story all over
again. Willie, remember, was the phrasemaker and bank robber ex-
traordinaire. When someone asked him why he did what he did to banks,
he is reported to have said (perhaps apocryphally), 'That's where the
money is." Maybe the cynics have gotten it right. At a time when rais-
ing taxes for any project - no matter how praiseworthy the cause - is
15 Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit
Rule, 55 U. Cm L. REv. 1105, 1158 (1988) [hereinafter Fischel & Langbein].
16 I use the word "disqualification" in its technical sense, as the IRC does: to describe a
plan that does not satisfy the requirements to qualify for the tax advantages in I.R.C.§§ 401ff,
501(a) (1990).
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not a crowd pleaser, the pension funds are a tempting target. Throughout
the 80s, Congress instead tapped the pension funds to close budget gaps.
Now the Clinton administration embraces the idea of using pension
money to rebuild the nation's infrastructure and inner cities. In circles
where pension funds are sacrosanct, however, taking pension assets to
build bridges, replace railroad tracks, and purify rivers is as damaging to
retirement funds as Sutton was to banks.
IV. CONGRESS THROWS A BLOCK
DOL could not have anticipated the resistance its announcement
generated on Capitol Hill, especially from Congressman Jim Saxton (R-
NJ), whose position as vice chairman of the Congressional Joint Eco-
nomic Committee commanded attention. Saxton first displayed hostility
to IB 94-1 in his op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal.17 He contended
that the Department intended to use lB 94-1 as a way of promoting the
use of ETIs as a means of funneling pension money into "high risk, low
return political projects."18 Saxton then introduced H.R. 1594, his so-
called Pension Protection Act of 1995, explicitly to nullify DOL's inter-
pretive bulletin. After gaining the support of the GOP leadership, Saxton
first succeeded in getting the approval of both the House Economic and
Educational Opportunities Committee and the Joint Economic Commit-
tee of the full Congress. Then he secured passage by the House after
watering down only some of the language to target more directly the
Labor Department's actions instead of the ETIs per se.
H.R. 1594 expresses Congress' belief that it is "inappropriate for the
Department of Labor, as the principal enforcer of fiduciary standards" -
the job ERISA assigns to DOL - "to take any action to promote or
otherwise encourage economically targeted investments."' 9 The bill
does not simply render TIB 94-1 "null and void" 20 by directing Labor to
rescind it; it adds insult to injury by prohibiting DOL employees from
traveling, lecturing, or "otherwise [to] expend resources available ... for
the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, economically targeted
investments."'21 It also prohibits federal agencies from maintaining or
establishing a database or clearinghouse relating to ETIs, as DOL has
proposed. Companion action in the House appropriations subcommittee
would prohibit the DOL and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
from using any fiscal year 1996 funds to implement or administer IB 94-
1.
17 Jim Saxton, A Raid on America's Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at AI2.
18 Id.
19 H.R. 1594, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1995).
20 Id. § 2(a).
21 Id. § 2(c).
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The Senate, however, has shown no inclination to pass S.774, the
companion bill to H.R. 1594, which Sen. Connie Mack (R-Fl.) intro-
duced. HR 1594's becoming law would send the message to plan fiduci-
aries that choosing a plan investment to produce a collateral economic
benefit would be a per se violation of federal law no matter how good the
risk-adjusted rate of return. Moreover, trustees would have no interpre-
tive guidance as to how to square investment policy with ERISA's fidu-
ciary provisions in regard to plan investments.
It seems an abuse of Congressional power to deny an administrative
agency the authority to provide such guidance, whether by rescinding
individual rulings or by denying funds for implementing or enforcing
same. Congress already has its hands full, with such global tasks as
agreeing on a budget, defense, tax bills, health and welfare reform, and
pension simplification, without getting into the business of micromanag-
ing the minutiae of pension administrative pronouncements. For years
Congress did not remedy far more significant concerns of pension ad-
ministration, such as the overlapping responsibilities of IRS and DOL in
the administration of ERISA's mirror provisions - which Congress it-
self, in enacting ERISA, foisted on the agencies and the public (inactivity
which caused the public great inconvenience, until the White House it-
self finally defused the problem with its so-called "reorganization plan,"
as I discuss below).
Not everyone in Congress joined this anti-IB 94-1 effort. Rep. Clay
(D-Mo.), speaking for many in his party, called it "pure; unadulterated
demagoguery," and, drawing from a then recent movie, called the effort
in the House "dumb, dumber, and 'dumb-agoguery."' 22
The Saxton bill will probably not be enacted; still, if nothing else, it
shows us that even the hint of devoting private pension moneys to assist
the work of government stirs up the most passionate debate. The Saxton
bill, in fact, appears to be part of the larger debate that is now raging
between the parties over just how much the government should be doing,
directly or indirectly, to affect the commonwealth.
V. INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN 94-1: WHERE'S THE BEEF?
Did LB 94-1 really warrant all this Sturm und Drang? Exactly what
is Congressman Saxton's beef with the bulletin? Is it that radical an
interpretation of ERISA's command that one invest pension funds pru-
dently, solely in the interests of participants, and for the exclusive pur-
pose of providing their benefits? Can we reconcile that requirement with
ETI investments, which, as DOL defined them, are "selected for the eco-
nomic benefits they create in addition to the investment of return to the
22 R.I.A PENSION & BENE-rr WL-, Sept. 18, 1995, at 5.
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EE benefit plan investor?"2 3 No problem, says DOL, as long as the in-
vestment gives the plan a competitive, risk-adjusted rate of return. DOL
does not proscribe risk per se as long as it is adequately compensated.
That compensation would preclude an investment producing a lower re-
turn than another available one of equal risk, as well as an investment
with a greater risk than another with the same rate of return. The com-
parison is, thus, between investments with similar risk characteristics, not
between ETIs and blue chips; and ERISA does not forbid a pension port-
folio that mixes risks, as long as the total portfolio legitimately fulfills
the needs of the plan.24
There is nothing radical here. The Labor Department, in fact, went
out of its way to fit its position on ETIs within the mainstream view of
approved fiduciary behavior in selecting pension assets. It has not been
obvious to the investment community that a pension plan can embark on
a program of selecting investments in order to accomplish an economic
objective irrelevant to the interests of both the participants and their plan
benefits. Such benefits could include goals of improving infrastructure,
creating jobs outside the participants' industry, providing local, low cost
housing. A handful of private rulings from the Labor Department, dur-
ing both Republican and Democratic administrations, approved socially
motivated investment, but apparently did not displace the public's long-
standing perceptions about a fiduciary's responsibilities. DOL maintains
that it intended IB 94-1 only to debunk these longstanding perceptions.
As we have seen, encouraging such investments was the position of
President Clinton even before he started running for the presidency.
What better place to find the funds to "rebuild America" than the $5
trillion now in pension funds? It certainly beats raising taxes in any poli-
tician's playbook. And that is exactly what bothers Congressman
Saxton. He sees the DOL announcement as simply part of the Adminis-
tration's scheme to expose private pension money to "high-risk, low re-
turn political projects."
Certainly nothing within the release supports this accusation; but,
inarguably, just making the announcement in such a high-profile way is
bound to increase the appeal of making economically targeted invest-
ments with pension funds. Secretary Reich, in answering the Saxton
charge in an October 26, 1994 letter to the editor in the Wall Street Jour-
nal, denied that "government officials are going to have greater say in
how pension plans invest their money."25 But just because fiduciaries
23 IB 94-1, supra note 2, at 32,606.
24 See Preamble to DOL regulation on investment of plan assets under prudence rule, 29
CFR § 2550.404a-1 (1979).
25 Robert B. Reich, Pension Fund "Raid" Just Ain't So, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1990, at
op-ed page.
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"will continue to make all investment decisions," as he says, 26 Reich
proves too much by giving insufficient weight to the fact that what gov-
ernment officials say affects pension investment behavior.
Of course, this Administration can contend, as it has in public testi-
mony (citing both Republican and Democratic precedents), that it is not
the first to endorse targeted investment actions by pension fiduciaries.
What is new, however, is the repudiation of the term "social investing" in
favor of the politically correct (if governmentese-laden) term "economi-
cally targeted investing."27 IB 94-1 itself cites some of the Department's
rulings over a number of years to support that thesis.28 Also, a pension
activist, declaring an interest in advancing ETIs, wrote a letter to Rep.
Saxton which documented favorable statements by President Bush and
other Republican officials, as well as by the prestigious Advisory Coun-
cil on Pension and Welfare Benefit Plans of the Department of Labor
serving during the Bush Administration. 29
The cited statement by President Bush was given in response to a
so-called Presidential Candidate Employee Benefit Questionnaire:
To the extent that socially motivated investments do not
compromise the economic balance of risk and return to
the plan and are consistent with other requirements, they
are not improper. However, pension assets should not
be used to subsidize investments that cannot stand on
their own merits.
Saxton's reply to the letter observed, as his only substantive demurrer,
that "no other head of PWBA (the Pension and Welfare Benefit Admin-
istration within the Labor Department) - a regulatory and enforcement
agency - has actively promoted ETIs, giving 11 major speeches on
ETIs and many others partly on ETIs all around the country." 30 Is that
the Congressman's real beef?
VI. THE SAVING OF NEW YORK CITY
So it is not a new idea to use pensions to serve social ends. The
original term for it, in fact, was "social investing," as we have seen. In
New York City's dark days some twenty years ago, the City Administra-
tion turned to the municipal pension funds - of the police, firemen, and
26 Id.
27 See Targeted Pension Fund Investments, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), noted in Phone
DOL, supra note 10.
28 IB 94-1, supra note 2.
29 Letter from Sam Gilbert, delegate to the 1995 White House Conference on Small
Business, to Representative Jim Saxton (May 11, 1995) (on file with the author).
30 Letter from Representative Jim Saxton to Sam Gilbert (June 5, 1995) (on file with the
author).
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teachers - to meet the City's payroll, or, more accurately, to buy City
bonds and thus provide money for the payroll. I know. I was in Wash-
ington then as an Assistant IRS Commissioner, in charge of the pension
part of the Revenue Service, and it so happened that I had to approve or
disapprove this use of pension money. It all depended on how I thought
it fell within the pension qualification rules. Cities, too, must follow the
rules.
But what makes the municipal pension plans of municipalities and
other public sector funds distinctive is that they are outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Labor Department; public sector plans do not contend with the
"dual jurisdiction" bugaboo which confronts private pension plans, for
they are not subject to the regulatory authority of the IRS or the DOL. In
the past, that overlapping jurisdiction has produced contradictory rules,
which raised the possibility that IRS might not subscribe to the philoso-
phy of the Labor Department, as later expressed in IB 94-1, at least as
applicable to public plans. (IB 94-1, of course, itself did not enter into
the considerations of IRS in the New York City matter; it came almost
20 years later.)
In view of IRS' sole jurisdiction over public pension plans, potential
conflict of agency views was not a factor in the resolution of the New
York City issue. The IRS had no policy regarding social investing when
it confronted the New York crisis in 1975, and it had scant time to for-
mulate one if it would make a timely response to the City's request.
Further, the agency's experiences were almost entirely in the private pen-
sion sector; they were of little precedential value in an issue involving
pension plans of a sovereign government established, using the dollars
taxpayers contributed because of the decrees of their elected representa-
tives. Indeed, the plans themselves functioned in a highly political envi-
ronment where even the plan trustees themselves held political office -
or were, at least, indebted to elected officials for their positions as trust-
ees. (The special factors at play in the public pension fund environment
is a subject all to itself.31 Alas, it was not yet written in 1975, when it
might have been most useful to us.)
It was not an easy call for the IRS. There was nothing in the City's
till then - not even the twenty-three dollars (adjusted for inflation) that
the Dutch had paid to New York's original inhabitants over three hun-
dred years ago. But in 1975, the banks would not lend the City another
dime. Its credit rating had fallen through the floor. Washington did not
want to help a profligate city that had squandered its funds on a free
university and other generous social welfare programs. Indeed, the New
31 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Politics of Public Pension Funds, THE PUBLIC INTER-
EsT, Spr. 1995, at 42; Beverly Ross Campbell & William Josephson, Public Pension Trustees'
Pursuit of Social Goals, 24 J. URBAN & CoNTmMP. LAW 43 (1983); Ford Report, supra note 3.
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York Daily News summarized the President's attitude toward New York
with the terse headline: "Ford to New York: 'Drop Dead.' '3 2 There was,
in fact, not enough money in the City's treasury even to satisfy the
weekly payroll due on Friday, and already it was Wednesday. (Unbe-
lievable as it now seems, the cash shortfall for the payroll was a mere
$130 million.) However unthinkable it was, bankruptcy for the City
seemed imminent.
In this grim setting, a 20-hour marathon meeting occurred in the big
conference room next to the Assistant Commissioner's office. The
agenda was to give the City's representatives an opportunity to persuade
the IRS to grant the City a pass to borrow from its pension funds without
adequate interest and security. Such a loan was not just a possible im-
prudent investment and a potential breach of fiduciary duty, but probably
also a "prohibited transaction" (as tax law dubs it 33) which would have
caused a loss of tax exemption. The loan could also have "disqualified"
the pension plans if the IRS had found that the City had violated the
exclusive benefit rule (I discuss it below). Dire tax consequences would
have resulted, especially for the trustees themselves. 34 Chief among
those possibilities was the violation of the most inviolable of the footings
supporting the special tax status of pension plans: the requirement that no
part of the pension trust be used for purposes "other than the exclusive
benefit of plan participants," which include "all objects or aims not
solely designed for the proper satisfaction of all liabilities to employees
or their beneficiaries." 35
During the course of the meeting, the IRS improvised a strategy to
provide a temporary solution to keep the City going until Congress
crafted and the President accepted a federal rescue package for New
York.36 The New York State legislature also pitched in with a statute
32 This, in fact, was the headline for the cover story of October 30, 1975.
33 The current provisions governing prohibited transactions are in I.R.C. § 4975. ERISA
added them. The provisions impose excise taxes on pension plans, but exclude governmental
plans. See I.R.C. § 4975(g)(2). Section 503 contains its own definition of "prohibited transac-
tions," and, unlike the ERISA provision which bars any loan between a plan and its sponsor
unless a government agency action exempts it, section 503 only includes loans made "without
the receipt of adequate security and a reasonable rate of interest." See § 503(b)(1). This statu-
tory language was especially important in the IRS deliberations involving the New York City
crisis.
34 For plans which are outside the reach of the excise tax provisions of I.R.C. § 4975,
such as a government plan, the effect of engaging in a prohibited transaction is loss of tax
exemption. See I.R.C. § 503. Government plans, however, are of course not also subject to
the excise tax, and do not lose their "qualified trust" status (with severe consequences for plan
participants) unless they also violate the "exclusive benefit" and "antidiscrimination" require-
ments of the Code. One wonders, though, whether exemption from federal taxation of a gov-
ernment plan's pension trust is sustainable - despite its having engaged in a prohibited
transaction - under the constitutional insulation of state and local instrumentalities.
35 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(a)(3).
36 P.L. 95-497, 92 Stat. 1665 (1978).
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which, in effect, exonerated the City pension trustees from any potential
violation of their fiduciary investment standards; the statute authorized
the trustees to consider, "in addition to other appropriate factors recog-
nized by law," the extent to which, by protecting the City fisc as the
ultimate source of funds for participants' retirement benefits, the
purchase of New York City paper might aid the City in fulfilling its obli-
gations as a contributor to its retirement systems and as ultimate under-
writer of the pension benefits. 37
Details of the exchanges between the City and the IRS are now a
matter of public record. So too are the novel "letters of intent to rule"
that IRS devised to deal quickly with the situation, pending the composi-
tion of a rescue package in Washington and Albany.38
But do not think that IRS gave away the store in 1975. IRS did not
acknowledge that it was relaxing the trustees' duty to invest retirement
system assets in accordance with traditional standards of prudence. On
the contrary, the Service predicated its action on an assumption it per-
haps made too readily that all the safeguards of a prudent investment
would accompany the pension plans' purchases of City securities. Thus,
IRS meant to send an unequivocal message that it interpreted the exclu-
sive-benefit rule as prohibiting, at a cost of less favorable tax status, any-
thing less than a prudent investment, and that IRS would stand by its
interpretation no less for public pension plans in crisis environments than
for private pension plans in pursuit of conventional goals.
Actually, even after all the caution, the investment still landed the
City's trustees in court in several landmark cases. (One retired teacher,
in fact, even named me for my part in allegedly jeopardizing his pen-
sion.39) In the most notable of the decisions, the federal district and ap-
peals courts in New York sanctioned the trustees for considering factors
extraneous to - or at least only obliquely related to - the simple pay-
ment of pensions.40 In a memorable passage, the trial court stated:
What determined the issue for the trustees was the spec-
ter of the City's bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the ques-
tion becomes the extent to which this was a legitimate
concern in the making of their investment decision .41
The court further noted:
37 1975 NY Laws ch. 890, sec. l(a).
38 Campbell & Josephson, supra note 31, at 89, 101
39 See Kirshner v. U.S., Sec. of Treas., Com'r of IRS, Alvin D. Lurie, in his capacity as
Ass't Com'r Employer (sic) Plans and Exempt Orgs. et al., 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
den. 442 U.S. 909 (1979), 444 U.S. 995 (1979), on remand sub. nor. Kirshner v. Goldberg et
al., 506 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).
40 Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 447 F.Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd,
595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
41 Id. at 1255.
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[U]nder the unique circumstances presented - in which
the survival of 'the fund as an entity' necessarily
achieved prominence - the trustees' investment deci-
sion was such as to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to
the IRS.42
While not directly on point, these decisions would still have been helpful
to the IRS in its deliberations; but the cases arose, of course, after the
IRS needed to act.
It took extraordinary efforts from many quarters to access the City's
pension funds; and, as we saw even in the decisions above, it would not
have happened if the trustees had not been faced with the absolutely
unthinkable prospect that the biggest city in America would otherwise go
bust and at the same time doom its pension plans anyway. Indeed, there
was testimony in the cases that the trustees would not have purchased the
City bonds but for this crisis. Hence, the New York crisis may not be
much precedent for using pension funds generally to "rebuild America,"
and even less so in view of the differences between public and private
funds generally. Obviously, no one now suggests that America invest
pension money in bankrupt entities. But the "inner city" warrens and
pot-holed highways, which resemble Baghdad and Sarajevo more than
Fifth Avenue and Main Street, do not occupy a significantly higher status
on the "legal list" for trust investments.
At bottom, the experience with the New York City crisis may estab-
lish little more than the principle that extraordinary circumstances bring
forth extraordinary remedies. This precedent, then, would justify, at
most, the placing of pension funds in high-risk investments in order to
achieve specific social ends in the most rare circumstances. The arbiters
in the New York case - the regulatory agency and the courts - were,
of course, aware of the dire consequences that might ensue all around
from denying approval of the fiduciaries' decision.
In the case of New York City, then, the indirect economic benefits
went to the plan participants. Indeed, the benefits went to the pension
trusts themselves. But would an even more indirect benefit - such as an
investment in a neighborhood project that enhances the overall working
environment of the participants - have been enough? Some observers
answer "no,"43 but some rulings suggest otherwise.44
42 Id. at 1259.
43 Langbein & Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 Micn. L. REv. 72, 101
(1980); Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for So-
cial and Political Goals, 128 PA. L. REv. 1340, 1363 (1980).
44 See 49 Fed. Reg. 13,770 (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 11,272 (1985); 58 Fed. Reg. 13,094,
13,096 (1993).
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This is the basic underlying debate over TB 94-1: If there is no
connection at all between the pension trust investment and the pension
payments, can the trustees' predisposition towards a societal goal influ-
ence the investment decision so long as the societal goal does not dimin-
ish the participants' actual plan benefits in terms of investment return
and asset security?
The 1975 New York City experience contrasts with an offering the
New York City administration has been contemplating. Republican
Mayor Rudolph Guiliani sees no evil in turning to pension trusts for mu-
nicipal needs. His administration last year developed a novel plan to
bundle city real estate tax liens for sale to a trust, which the city would
create specifically as an investment vehicle for this program.45 This in-
vestment trust would fund the purchase partly by borrowing from pen-
sion trusts and other institutional investors, and the arrangement would
provide the lenders with over a dollar fifty of delinquent tax bills as col-
lateral for every one dollar of loan. At that level of collateral, the lend-
ers' risk would be "tiny" - in view of the investment bankers to whom
the City circulated requests for bids. The interest cost, therefore, would
be in the range investors associate with short-term commercial paper.
Now the City would again go to pension funds, as it did in 1975, to
finance its budget. But there are many differences between a financially
solvent city's borrowing from private pension plans, on the one hand,
and a near-bankrupt city's tapping of its own municipal plans in 1975 as
a last resort lender. Further, the price of the proposed tax-lien loans will
have a competitive market rate of return and involve no subsidy from the
city or concession from the investors. The transaction could serve as a
model everywhere for ETI offerings of federal, state, and local
authorities.
Can we properly characterize such investments as ETIs? And does
it matter? Would our characterization depend on the motives of pension
plan fiduciaries, if we could even discern them? Does the result turn on
whether the issuer seeks out the investor or whether the investor seeks
out the issuer? Just posing these questions answers them; for if nothing
but the motive of the fiduciary in selecting the chosen investment distin-
guishes an ETI from a non-ETI, why should just a different motive be a
badge of fiduciary dereliction?
If New York's sale of tax liens to private pension plans does occur,
and if it attracts the attention of any pension regulators, they would not
likely come from the IRS, as in 1975, but from the Labor Department
(unless the City also offered the investment to its municipal pension
45 See David Cay Johnston, New York City Plans Market in Its Tax Bills, N.Y. TaIMs,
Jan. 13, 1996, at 35.
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plans). The reason is that the city's connection with the transaction this
time would be as the seller, not as pension plan sponsor, so DOL's juris-
diction would extend to both the purchasing pension plans and their fidu-
ciaries. Given the existence of IB 94-1, DOL's intervention could be
advantageous to New York.
VII. A TALE OF TWO COUNTIES
Before we finish discussing the New York experience, we should
note that the 1975 pension loans did not cause the loss of even a subway
token. The New York City experience, however, contrasted with that of
Orange County, California; there, a fling in derivatives by municipal
funds turned out far less satisfactorily. We, of course, cannot conclude
from that comparison that all ETI investments are sound and all deriva-
tive investments otherwise. Public opinion, however, and Congressional
response often turn on one single calamitous event; Congress enacted
ERISA, for example, on the momentum of its outrage over the Stude-
baker Company's pensioners' losing their benefits when the once power-
ful automobile company failed with greatly underfunded pension plans.
Similarly, there would likely be strong, explicit anti-ETI laws now had
the New York loans gone sour. But, on the other hand, nothing indicates
that the Orange County debacle will result in new restrictive rules gov-
erning pension investments. What is the difference? Apparently, noth-
ing but greed and naivete motivated the Orange County investments;
and, besides being imprudent, the investments are not a violation of ER-
ISA any more than the pension plan investments in the junk-bond annui-
ties of Executive Life Insurance Company, besides being imprudent and
evidence of self-dealing, were violations.4
We do not have to reenact the prudent man rule every time there is
an imprudent trust investment. That rule well served the trust area for
many decades, and it can now well protect pension plan participants
against imprudent ETIs.
What, then, is there about ETIs that evokes such strong resistance?
Calls for legislative remedy come equally from academics47 and from
politicians like Rep. Saxton, who would prohibit ETIs per se even absent
specific evidence of abuse. Meanwhile, far more disastrous investment
experiences attract no Congressional opposition. The difference is that,
by definition, one enters into ETI transactions explicitly for a purpose
"other than the exclusive benefit of plan participants," and to some ob-
46 For a discussion of the Executive Life fiasco, see Alvin D. Lurie, Pensions Gone
South: GICs cum Junk were Wrong Road to Travel, 65 N.Y.ST. B. J. 34 (1993). See gener-
ally, Alvin D. Lurie, Mutual Benefit and Executive Life: The Lessons of the Two Biggest Life
Insurance Failures Ever, Program Materials of A.B.A. SEc. Bus. LAw (Ann. Meet. 1993).
47 See Phone DOL, supra note 10, at 335, 355.
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servers, that definition directly implicates the exclusive benefit rule. We
now turn to this rule.
VIII. EXCLUSIVITY: A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
There is an overarching concern for plan fiduciaries - as great as
being prudent and avoiding prohibited transactions. It derives from the
proposition that we accumulate pension funds for only one thing: to pro-
vide for the secure retirement of workers. The first imperative of pen-
sion plans, and the most requisite prerequisite to their standing under
ERISA and the tax law, is that they operate for the "exclusive benefit" of
participants.48
Exclusivity, as it applies to pension plans, first surfaced in the tax
law over fifty years before ERISA's enactment. It was not a fiduciary
concept (which tax law did not directly address), but an enforcer of the
antidiscrimination principle which has always been the basis for favored
tax entitlement. 49
The concept also stems from the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which is
one of the "most fundamental and distinctive" rules of private trust law.50
ERISA, for unknown reasons, does not express this fiduciary command
in terms of "loyalty"; it uses instead the tax law term "exclusive benefit."
But it is obvious that the thrust of ERISA is to impose the highest stan-
dards of fiduciary conduct on the persons handling pension funds -
"the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive" was Cardozo's great
phrase.51 This is the reason that the Act mandates the delivery of bene-
fits in the trust format.52 It then specifies fiduciary responsibilities; bars
fiduciary self-dealing; absolutely prohibits all transactions in which fidu-
ciaries or other parties in interest deal with plans, except as specifically
exempted by statute or government action; provides for extensive legal
and equitable recourse by participants, sponsors, and the government to
enforce fiduciary standards; and even prohibits exculpatory provisions,
all in addition to the exclusive benefit stricture.53 Thus, while borrowing
extensively from the common law of trusts, ERISA imposes responsibili-
ties on trustees and other "fiduciaries" (a class under ERISA that in-
cludes much more than simply trustees 54) that extend further than
common law responsibilities in order to reflect the special nature and
48 See supra note 3.
49 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 15, at 1109; Phone DOL, supra note 10, at 342
nn. 33-34 (and accompanying text).
50 Fischel & Langbein, supra note 15, at 1108.
51 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928).
52 ERISA § 403(a). The statute also requires a written instrument providing for one or
more named fiduciaries, in order to establish the plan. Id. § 402(a)(1).
53 ERISA § 410(a).
54 Il § 3(21).
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purposes of employee benefit plans.55 So we can see "exclusive benefit"
more as belt and suspenders than bedrock.
It was therefore unfortunate that in the pension area the draftsmen
employed the concept of exclusive benefit as a surrogate for the fiduci-
ary's traditional duty of loyalty. This drafting, in fact, may be responsi-
ble for much of the mischief in this area of the law.5 6 The concept might
serve well in private trusts where the trustee's relationship to the cestui
que trust is often simpler; but in the setting of the pension trust, it fails to
take into account that such an arrangement is the embodiment of a com-
plex set of relationships and myriad interests: between employer and
employees, for example, or among different employers in a multiem-
ployer plan; between different classes of employees (younger and older,
rank-and-file and management, shareholder employees and others, col-
lective bargaining groups and non-union, contributory and non-contribu-
tory, long-term and short-term); between active and retired workers; and
even between private pension plans themselves and the government
guarantor of pensions, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. In this
context, the term "exclusive" serves as little purpose as commenting that
the President of the United States must serve all the people exclusively.
Further, the rule literally applies to all tax-qualified and other so-
called pension plans equally; but there is no single type of "pension"
plan, and not all plans are designed to provide retirement benefits. For
example, just a deferral of benefits for "a fixed number of years" - as
few as two - fulfills the requirements of a tax qualified profit-sharing
plan.5 7 So the term "benefit" provides an unsatisfactory standard for
such a disparate group, for what "benefits" the participants of a true re-
tirement plan is not what may benefit the participants of a plan which
defers compensation for a short term of years. Similarly, we should not
compare the benefits in a defined contribution plan with those in a de-
fined benefit plan, any more than we should compare salary reduction
plan benefits (the so-called 401(k) plans) 58 with employer-pay-all plan
benefits.
How, then, can we observe the exclusive benefit obligation from
plan to plan, and how can we parse it among different benefit groups
within a single plan? The concept is obviously an imperfect - indeed,
crude - instrument for such microsurgical cuts. Accordingly, in the
face of this, courts have developed, inter alia, the "incidental benefit"
55 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 15, at 1113-19.
56 Id. at 1110, 1128.
57 See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii); Rev. Rul. 71-295, 1971-2 CB 184; and see Rev. Rul.
68-24, 1968-1 CB 150 (2-year deferral not necessary after 60 months of participation).
58 I.R.C. § 401(k).
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principle 59 to overcome what would otherwise be an insurmountable
barrier. 60
"Exclusive benefit" is, on its face, a misleading principle. Its mean-
ing has eluded cloistered academics, politicians who are running for of-
fice, and even jurists with life tenure. The principle makes sense only
where a conflict of interest arises between plan participants and others.
In this circumstance, the rule compels that only the participants' interests
matter. No one else's interests balance the scale. On the other hand, if
there is no sacrifice of participants' interests, concurrently serving the
interests of nonparticipants cannot flout the exclusivity principle.
This view of the proper function of "exclusive benefit" emerges
clearly when we recognize that the principle derives from the private
trust law duty of loyalty. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act states that
"loyalty" compels the trustee to "invest and manage the trust assets
solely in the interest of the beneficiaries."'61 The comment of the drafts-
men explaining this rule is instructive:
The duty of loyalty is not limited to settings entailing
self-dealing or conflict of interest in which the trustee
would benefit personally from the trust. "The trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust
not to be guided by the interest of any third per-
son." . . . No form of so-called "social investing" is con-
sistent with the duty of loyalty if the investment activity
entails sacrificing the interests of trust beneficiaries-
for example, by accepting below-market returns-in
favor of the interests of the persons supposedly benefit-
ted by pursuing the particular social cause. 62
Exclusivity, then, does not require that no other entity shall benefit
from an investment; it merely requires that the other can neither rival nor
compromise the chief purpose of the investment, which is to protect
workers during their retirement. Thus, even the worthwhile goal of sav-
ing a business and, consequently, saving the pension participants' jobs
must be subordinate to the purpose of providing a pension.
A fortiori, improving the economy, national or local, or improving
the roads, or rails, or the clean air - whatever might be the community's
goals, and no matter how lofty, worthy, and patriotic these goals are -
cannot supersede the primary purpose of all pension plans and, obvi-
ously, cannot justify an investment that might jeopardize their delivery.
59 See Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
60 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 15, at 1137.
61 Uniform Prudent Investor Act [hereinafter UPIA] § 5 (explanatory comment under
that section).
62 Id. (emphasis added).
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From the perspective of the plan trustees, better the bridges stay unre-
paired than the pension promises be broken. One cannot quarrel with
that position.
I would not even suggest that improving the economy is a proper
consideration for pension trustees whatever the benefit to plan partici-
pants. Still, pension plans do not exist in a vacuum. They depend upon a
healthy business climate.
Nevertheless, most impartial observers would agree that the com-
mand of the exclusive benefit rule refers to only the specific participants'
plan benefits, not their benefits as members of the larger community. 63
While we can argue that the "benefit" ERISA identifies allows a broad
reading, support for the ETI would be shaky if it depended on that argu-
ment alone. As I have suggested, the better argument is that the exclu-
sive benefit rule is not incompatible with - in fact, does not even
address - the employment of investment criteria which do not compro-
mise in any way the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.
We can even take one more step and argue that the exclusive benefit
principle does not apply at all to certain parties: parties the plan deals
with at arms' length when conducting the business of the plan (fiducia-
ries and parties-in-interest aside); the landlord, the vendor, the employee,
indeed, all parties who derive benefit from the respective transactions. In
the same way, the company whose stock the plan purchases at fair mar-
ket value, although obviously benefiting from the plan investment, is not
within the reach of the rule, regardless of why the fiduciaries chose to
invest in that company. It follows, then, that the exclusive benefit rule
does not affect a non-concessionary ETI.
IX. A NEW PARADIGM FOR PENSION PLANS
I submit that a more fundamental assault on the exclusive benefit
principle is appropriate. The exclusive benefit principle was drafted for a
different stage of pension development, when the plans had not yet accu-
mulated the trillions of dollars they now hold (40 percent of the Nation's
capital). It was when we perceived only dimly the role of pensions in the
state of our society, when the concept of "tax expenditures" had not yet
been enunciated (certainly not in the context of pension plans), 64 when
63 See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 43, at 1370-1371 n. 151; DISINVESTMENT, supra
note 10, at 17-18.
64 See generally, Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans,
Tax Expenditures, and the Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 VA. TAX REV. 591 (1994). The following
pieces indicate the passionate debate in academic circles over whether the term "tax expendi-
ture" properly applies to a scheme for taxing pensions: Zelinsky, The Tax Treatment of Quali-
fied Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 No. CAR. L. REv. 315 (1988): Norman P.
Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to Professor Zelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 225 (1991): Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder
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government guaranties of pensions did not exist, when the law that gov-
erned rights and interests of the various parties was more primitive, when
the plans themselves were much simpler, and when Capital Hill thought
more simplistically about them.
Perhaps now is the time for Congress to formulate a new paradigm
for governing pension plans. This paradigm would better comprehend,
accommodate, and balance the many different interests involved, includ-
ing the interests of government. Given this multiplicity of interested par-
ties, benefits, and social policies which intersect at the modem pension
plan, the structure is much like a public corporation with competing and
conflicting claims upon it.
Let us consider the public corporation. Its management, like the
management of a pension plan, bears actual fiduciary responsibilities and
a duty of primary loyalty to its principal constituency. In the former, the
constituency is the stockholders, and in the latter, it is the pensioners.
Nevertheless, we are long past the point where the directors and officers
of a corporation must ignore the interests of their communities or of their
employees: preventing pollution, providing support for the local arts,
establishing day care facilities for their employees.
In an op-ed piece this past January, Secretary Reich reminded us of
the words of the chairman of Standard Oil in 1951:
The job of management is to maintain an equitable and
working balance among the claims of the various di-
rectly interested groups ... stockholders, employees,
customers and the public at large.65
As the Secretary's column points out, even Fortune Magazine agreed that
corporate executives had the "duty to be industrial statesmen who
worked for the good of their employees and communities as well as
shareholders." 66
It took the 1932 seminal work of Berle and Means on the modem
corporation 67 to change the way we view corporate ownership and man-
agement. Indeed, before 1932, we did not label the two as "divorced"68
to Professor Stein, 9 Am. J. TAx PoL'Y 257. And if I entered this law review war, my piece
would read in its entirety (title and all):
A Riposte to the Above
What about counting the negative tax expenditures occurring when pensions are
in pay status, sometimes producing rates at or near the 100% bracket when toting up
federal and state income, excise and estate taxes? Fiscal budgeting to the contrary
notwithstanding, there is a tomorrow.
65 Robert B. Reich, How to Avoid These Layoffs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A21.
66 Id.
67 BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932; rev.
ed. 1967).
68 See id. (preface to 1932 ed.).
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or acknowledge the obligation the modem corporation had to the inter-
ests of the state due to the "state expenditures of taxpayers' money" on
behalf of corporations. 69 'the parallels to pension plans are striking. It
might take just such a rigorous examination of the modem pension plan
to bring us to a new similar understanding of the interests the pension
fiduciary can take into account. The beginnings of this examination, in
fact, may already exist; in the writings of Fischel and Langbein 7° we find
remarkable insights:
Because ... the employer and the employee both
benefit from the pension or welfare benefit plan, there is
an obvious difficulty in interpreting the exclusive benefit
rule. The plans are established for the mutual advantage
of employer and employee, not for the exclusive benefit
of one. The exclusive benefit rule on its face is inconsis-
tent with the economic realities of the plans.71
[I]f fiduciaries and courts were directed to identify
and weigh all the relevant interests, they would be better
able to maximize the interests of all the parties. In a
world of voluntary plan formation, if the contracting par-
ties understood that the legal standards for evaluating
plan decisionmaking had become more realistic and
more reasonable, they would be more likely to form
plans and to establish higher levels of pension saving.72
The confusion between ... perspectives is. .. evi-
dent in the requirement that trustees must act with an
"eye single to the interests of the participants and benefi-
ciaries." The difficulty with this requirement is that it
begs the question of who the beneficiaries are. If the
employer were also understood to be a beneficiary from
the ex ante perspective, the dual loyalty problem would
be greatly reduced.73
The authors recognize that other potential conflicts of interest be-
sides employer-participant differences inhere in the pension
environment:
69 See id. at xvi (Professor Berle's preface to rev. ed.).
70 In a separate work, Professor Langbein discussed the separation of ownership and
control that characterizes large pension funds. In the context of social investing, he argues that
the practice is a "danger" to participants. Dism va-smNr, supra note 10, at 8.
71 Fischel & Langbein, supra note 15, at 1118.
72 Id. at 1125.
73 Id. at 1128.
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The language of the exclusive benefit rule speaks in
the plural. It stipulates that a duty of loyalty is owed to
"participants and their beneficiaries." It does not as-
sume, as it could not logically assume, that all partici-
pants and their beneficiaries will always have the same
interests.74
[S]ome mechanism must exist for resolving con-
flicts among employees, even when the statute overlooks
the problem.75
In Donovan v. Walton,76 the Florida federal district court dealt with
a multiemployer plan which invested pension assets for the purpose, in
part, of creating jobs for union members and thereby benefiting the union
directly. After noting that there were, in fact, parallel benefits for the
union and the pension fund, the court concluded that "[e]ven without
these benefits to the Fund," the exclusive benefit rule "simply does not
prohibit a party other than a plan's participants and beneficiaries from
benefiting in some measure from a prudent transaction with the plan." 77
The case for providing social benefits through pension funds is not
difficult to make when the public interest benefits. The public fisc, after
all, makes substantial contributions for the establishment and mainte-
nance of tax qualified pension plans. There are also the public contribu-
tions to the corporate sponsors of such plans, upon which Professor Berle
posited much of his view of the role of "modem" corporate
management.78
A rule of law would easily develop if the two regulatory agencies
which enforce pension law made it clear that social investing is not a per
se violation of the exclusive benefit principle or of the other legal stan-
dards which protect pensioners. This is just what DOL tried to do with
LB 94-1. Courts could then defer readily to such administrative rule-
making, as they customarily do.
What is the administrative posture at this time? The IRS has not yet
spoken directly on the matter, so we can only infer its views from such
incidents as the New York City crisis, which, as we have seen, may be of
limited value in creating a new principle for private plans. The IB 94-1
issue might arise in matters under IRS jurisdiction, but, as far as we can
glean from the public prints, the Service has not currently expressed its
concurrence with the DOL's view.
74 Id. at 1159.
75 Id
76 609 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd per cur. sub nom. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d
586 (11th Cir. 1986), reh. den., 802 F.2d 1399 (1986).
77 609 F. Supp. at 1245
78 See text supra accompanying notes 67-69.
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We must also be cautious when we try to read DOL's current offi-
cial position. As long as H.R. 1594 sits out there in the legislative hop-
per, we can assume that it may be exerting an in terrorem effect on
DOL's readiness to act on its Interpretive Bulletin. Moreover, the De-
partment may be hesitating because of the possibility of a new occupant
in the White House on January 1, 1997.
X. THE ORIGIN OF DOL'S CURRENT POSITION
Long before the arrival of the Clinton appointees, the Labor Depart-
ment identified the participants' interest in their retirement income as the
only "interest" that pension investments serve. These are the actual
words of the Department, in a so-called advisory opinion:
In deciding whether and to what extent to invest in a
particular investment a fiduciary must consider only fac-
tors relating to the interests of plan participants and ben-
eficiaries in their retirement income.79
The opinion continued:
Thus a decision to make an investment may not be influ-
enced, for example, by a desire to stimulate the construc-
tion industry and generate employment, unless the
investment, when judged solely on the basis of its eco-
nomic value to the plan, would be equal or superior to
alternative investments available to the fund. 0
We can find the antecedent for this "equal or superior" investment
option in comments a former head of pension administration in the De-
partment of Labor made some years before that pronouncement. Writing
as an official, but not ex cathedra, the pension head said that while the
protection of retirement income is "the overriding social objective gov-
erning the investment of plan assets," that overriding social objective
"does not exclude the provision of incidental benefits to others."8'
Rather, the plan trustee still can choose among "economically equal but
socially unequal investments. '8 2
When he spoke about relying on the "incidental benefit" concept,
that official obviously did not mean to indicate the absence of a deliber-
ate choice. Instead, he meant to coat social investing with the cloak of a
time-honored doctrine. He was not saying that the social benefit must
unintentionally occur, but that it could be a significant factor in an in-
79 DOL Advisory Op. 82-52A (Sept. 28, 1982)
80 Id.
81 See Ian Lanoff, The Sound Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May it be Done
Lawfully under ERISA?, 31 LABOR L. J. 387, 389 (1980).
82 Id.
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vestment decision. However, this was not an official pronouncement on
which fiduciaries could safely rely.
So it remained for the proposition to be made official that it is no sin
to favor an investment that results in a social benefit, and that the trustees
do not have to conceal their awareness of the social benefit and disclaim
that it greatly influenced their choosing the investment. That is what the
New York City Bar Association committee was asking for in the report I
cited above, and, presumably, that is what DOL intended 1B 94-1 to ac-
complish. But the status of that interpretive bulletin is now problematic.
Unfortunately, the rulings DOL made before issuing lB 94-1 have
sent mixed signals. In one, the trustees applied the appropriate economic
criteria and financial standards in soliciting plan investments, but they
invested only where there was union labor. The Department nevertheless
approved the use of these dual criteria on the condition that the policy
must not diminish the choice of investments that would be available
otherwise.83
Another ruling, however, legal commentators have read as approv-
ing the consideration of social criteria only as secondary factors. In that
case, the trustees elected the investments of a particular class (real estate)
on purely economic and financial considerations, but then the trustees
further screened the investments so that only union labor projects made
the final cut. 84 Perhaps the difference between the two rulings is simply
cosmetic. It would always be possible to couch the policy in "primary"
and "secondary" terms. But it should not be necessary.
In still another pair of rulings,85 a body that had only investment
advisory authority screened the preferred investments (housing loans in
communities where union members resided and debt instruments of
health and education institutions serving those communities), but the in-
vestment managers still exercised independent fiduciary judgment. The
potential for the managers paying lip service to this independence, while
in practice following the "advice" of the investment advisers, makes this
also an unsatisfactory, if not hypocritical, standard.
Again the Department harkened back to the "equal or superior"
standard. It stated in the later of those letter rulings:
A decision to make an investment may not be influenced
by non-economic factors unless the investment, when
judged solely on the basis of its economic value to the
83 DOL Letter to James S. Ray, Jul. 8, 1988 (relating to Union Labor Life Ins. Co.) (on
file with author). 1B 94-1 cites this letter with apparent approval. See supra note 2.
84 DOL Advisory Op. 82-52A, supra note 79, and accompanying text.
85 DOL Advisory Ops. 80-33A (June 3, 1980) and 88-16A (Dec. 19, 1988).
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plan, would be equal or superior to alternative invest-
ments available to the plan.8 6
It is obviously easier to make the case for a targeted investment policy
where the target has a direct connection with the well-being of the plan
participants - as in the case of affordable housing, better schools in the
community, or even the economic health of the company or industry for
which the participants work. But even there, at least until IB 94-1, the
government has not clearly enunciated a policy that such an investment
strategy squares with ERISA's "solely-in-the interest-of' mandate.
Morse v. Stanley is another case which involved not investment pol-
icy, but the trustees' exercise of discretion: They decided whether to
give accelerated lump-sum pension benefits to participants who left their
employer to work for a competitor. This time the court viewed expan-
sively the factors which trustees can consider while still serving "solely
the interests" of plan participants:
Where an employee leaves a company to accept a posi-
tion outside the industry, that company's profits are af-
fected by the costs it must incur to groom a replacement;
but if that same employee accepts a position within the
same industry and with a direct competitor, not only
must the first company bear the costs of grooming a re-
placement, but it suffers additional detriment from the
competitor's use of that employee's talents and contacts.
This is especially so here, where profitable accounts
were actually transferred to a competitor. Hence, since
an exodus of key . . . employees plainly reduces the
growth and fiscal strength of the Plan, the Trustees' de-
cision to deny accelerated benefits to the employees here
could scarcely be viewed as a breach of their duty to
administer the Plan in the sole interest of all its
participants.87
The holding in that case, however, rests on the direct connection
between the trustees' action, the economic health of the plan, and the job
security of the participants. As we have already observed, where the
social benefits of the investment less directly affect - or affect less sig-
nificantly - the interests of the participants, it may be harder for the
trustees to defend their decision. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the La-
bor Department's advisory group on ETIs is sympathetic to the more
expansive view and has even supported the Labor Department's current
leanings. In its report to the Labor Department, the group wrote:
86 DOL Advisory Ops. 80-33A, supra note 85.
87 Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1146 (2d Cir. 1984).
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As long as trustees are loyal to participants and invest
for their exclusive benefit, they should be free to seek
investments which generate economic benefits for their
region or industry. To the extent that their search for (or
willingness to examine) non-traditional investments
overcomes subtle rigidities in our capital markets and re-
sults in financing worthy investments which might
otherwise not be funded, it benefits society as well as
their plan participants. 88
The problem is that such an investment yardstick may flout the both
"exclusive benefit" and "solely in the interest" tests which pertain to pen-
sion investments. At least, this is what the fiduciaries generally believe.
The only thing that would make fiduciaries comfortable when consider-
ing such alternative investments would be the Department's ruling on a
series of fact patterns which illustrate the economically-equal but so-
cially-unequal proposition (we are assuming, of course, that the Saxton
bill does not become law). But even these rulings might not be suffi-
cient, for the Labor Department is not the sole enforcer of trustee liabil-
ity. The IRS is also a player, of course, and plan participants have direct
recourse to the courts as well.
XI. FEDERAL LEGISLATION?
Federal legislation would clarify the rules in one fell swoop. This
legislation would be 180 degrees off the course of the Saxton bill and
share the purpose of the Seventies New York legislature when it ex-
pressly allowed fiduciaries to consider "social . . . in addition to other
appropriate factors." 89 Such enabling legislation should include at least
these five guideposts to assure that trustees engage in the proper drill: (1)
looking solely at economic merits, the investment is suitable for the plan;
(2) the purpose of the investment is to provide for the participants' plan
benefits; (3) the social benefit, while not necessarily subordinate to the
other primary purpose of the investment, does not in any way compro-
mise that purpose; (4) the trustees clearly identify the social benefit; (5)
the targeted investment does not thwart, in any reasonably foreseeable
way, the participants' receiving their plan benefits.
Thus, if the trustees can make the investment with due regard to
providing participants' plan benefits, and if the trustees in no way had
subordinated their primary obligation to other interests, their actions
would then satisfy ERISA's "solely in the interest of participants" stan-
dard. Under the legislation, then, trustees would not have to "explain
88 See Executive Summary in DOL ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 6.
89 See text accompanying note 37.
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away" the social benefits which flow naturally from a targeted invest-
ment. But it would not, of course, sanction benefits which serve the in-
terests - personal, professional, or political - of the trustees
themselves.
The legislation would also make it possible to devise a method for
protecting pensions while enabling plan trustees to frankly make invest-
ments which serve the welfare of the nation, the community, the industry
- any legitimate object of social concern. It then becomes just a matter
of the trustees choosing carefully when to make these socially-concerned
investments. If the trustees can still demonstrate a sound and appropriate
underlying purpose for these investments - an underlying principle that
is relevant to the pension participants - the investment need not cause
the trustees or their plans to suffer legal sanctions.
Administrative action or judicial decision can achieve this outcome
(barring enactment of the Saxton bill), but only federal legislation can
make it certain. More exactly, federal legislation must do the job be-
cause of the federal preemption rule. As we have already seen, New
York State legislation was critical to the New York City bailout; and the
states and municipalities are naturally tempted to induce and sometimes
even command public pension plans under their jurisdictions to invest in
local infrastructure, industry, environment. State legislation works there
because ERISA preemption is not applicable to the public sector plans.
Were state legislatures, however, not to limit legislation to public pen-
sion funds, it is doubtful that the legislation could withstand a preemp-
tion challenge, so central is fiduciary liability and authority to ERISA.
Federal preemption of issues arising under ERISA is a growing area
of the law, and the Supreme Court is repeatedly umpiring disputes. In
the recent Travelers case, for example, the Supreme Court refused to
strike down a state tax impacting generally on hospital and medical plans
which ERISA governs. The case had some commenting that the court
significantly narrowed the ERISA preemption doctrine. The Labor De-
partment, in fact, has indicated that it will attempt to build upon the deci-
sion in order to facilitate plan participants' use of state law to achieve
relief that federal law might not offer.90 But Travelers seems to be only
a modest departure from the trend of enlarging the reach of preemption,
in strictly limiting ERISA's preemption to state laws that "relate to" em-
ployee benefit plans.
90 New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insur.
Co., 514 U.S. - (1995), 131 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1995). See Mamorsky, Impact of Traveler on Self-
Insured Plans, 11 J. CoMP. & BEN. No. 2, 57 (1995). For discussion of recent DOL initiatives
to limit ERISA's preemptive reach in the wake of Travelers, see R.I.A. PENsIoN & BENEFrr
NEws, Jan. 22, 1996, at 2.
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Regarding core ERISA issues, we cannot doubt that federal preemp-
tion will prevail. Thus, effective federal legislation is needed if there is
to be any clear resolution of the ETI issue in the near future. But getting
the House of Representatives, in effect, to reverse itself on the ETI issue
may be an unrealistic goal, at least so long as it remains in Republican
hands.
XII. DEFINED BENEFIT AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PLANS: SAME GENUS, DIFFERENT SPECIES
All of pensiondom is divided into two parts: defined benefit plans
and defined contribution plans. These terms refer to, respectively: (i)
plans where the benefit is fixed, i.e., traditional annuity-type plans; and
(ii) plans where the contribution is fixed, as in money purchase, 401(k),
and profit-sharing plans. (In actuality, there are hybrid plans which have
both characteristics, but identifying these subsets in this discussion is not
necessary.)
Considering the substantial difference between these two main cate-
gories of pensions - especially regarding participants' direct stake in
the success or failure of their investments - we cannot discuss ETIs and
pensions as if all types of pension plans were just one species. To the
participant, the chief difference is that in the former type of plan, the risk
of the investment falls on the employer and, as a last-resort guarantor, the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Thus, only a residual risk re-
mains on the participant if there still is a shortfall after tapping the em-
ployer and the PBGC. In the defined contribution plan, on the other
hand, the participant directly bears the investment risk, and this differ-
ence affects plan fiduciaries' receptivity to ETIs. But it does not elimi-
nate the fiduciary's concerns in defined benefit plans because the
standards of prudence, exclusivity, and sole interest apply uniformly to
both classes of plans.
Nevertheless, where the employer is, in effect, the guarantor of the
plan benefits, and where the employer or its designee serves as trustee -
typically this is the case with public pension funds - we see more ETIs
as a percentage of plan assets. Fiduciaries are understandably less eager
to place a participant's own account in a nontraditional investment with-
out the participant's having clearly designated a choice. But even the use
of participant-directed accounts does not insulate the fiduciary against
offering poor-grade investment options.91
91 See ERISA § 404(c); 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906 (1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-
1). The regulations specify in great detail what the plan must do by way of offering "a broad
range of investment options," inter alia, in order to achieve insulation.
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The participant, in fact, is under legal constraints that prevent di-
recting the trustee to invest in the investments the participant has se-
lected. Presumably in recognition of these legal constraints, last year's
White House Conference on Small Business adopted a recommendation
that would "[m]odify current legislation to facilitate the ability of an in-
dividual to invest up to 50% of his or her own self-directed and/or man-
aged qualified plans including profit sharing, 401(k) plans, individual
IRAs, Keogh, and SEP plans in specific small business[es] of his/her
own choice." 92 Presumably, such legislation would enable the trustee,
with impunity, to offer participants the opportunity to individually desig-
nate preferred ETIs under proper safeguards.
Thus, the issues affecting whether to invest in ETIs are not much
different for the fiduciaries of a defined benefit plan and for the fiducia-
ries of a defined contribution plan. The principal reason that public pen-
sion trusts use more ETIs (although public pension trusts still represent a
minor portion of total funds) is doubtless the political influences that can
affect the investment decisions of such plans.93 In several visible in-
stances, the disastrous consequences of these pressures has been docu-
mented:94 losses of millions of dollars which public employee pension
plans suffered in Alaska, Connecticut, and Kansas, for example. Those
consequences, of course, are factors one must take into account when
advocating an unfettered ETI policy. Nevertheless, they are considera-
tions peculiar to the public plans; they should not influence the debate
generally.
Legislation such as the Saxton bill, however, does not address that
problem, for the public pension funds are, as we already noted, com-
pletely beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Department. Because tax
rules, on the other hand, generally apply equally to all pension plans and
participants, only 'he Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Depart-
ment are in a position to influence investment policy in that area. The
chances of the House Ways and Means Committee approving the Saxton
bill - if the legislation were even amended to embrace the Internal Rev-
enue Code or the provisions of ERISA bearing on the Code - borders
on zero. And then there is the Senate Finance Committee.
92 See Recommendations of 1995 White House Conference on Small Business [hereinaf-
ter "WHCSB"], Reference No. 5. A copy of the so-called "Final 60 Recommendations" is on
file with the author.
93 See Romano, supra note 31; Ford Report, supra note 3; REPORT OF U.S. GEN. Acc'G
OFF., PUBLIC PENSION PLANS - EVALUATION OF ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INvEsTMF-N-
PROGRAMS, GAO/PEMD 95-13 (Mar. 1995) (demonstrating that relatively little public pension
money has been directed into ETIs, despite political pressures on public plan fiduciaries)
[hereinafter "GAO Report"]. See text accompanying notes 104-106 infra.
94 See, e.g., GAO report, supra note 93, at 22-23.
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XIII. CAPITAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS
This paper focuses on investments which serve, for example, the
welfare of cities and states. JB 94-1 also includes small business invest-
ments within the classes of investments it covers, because small busi-
nesses do not have access to the capital of big business. In this respect,
the Interpretive Bulletin anticipated recommendations of the 1995 White
House Conference on Small Business. High on the list that Conference
adopted was Recommendation No. 5:
In order to increase the availability of capital for
small business, Congress shall:
a) Authorize the SEC or an appropriate entity to
create or streamline regulations and vehicles for public
and small and large private company pensions, profit
sharing, 401(k) plans, individual IRAs, Keogh, and SEP
plans to invest in small business by accessing the private
capital markets and encouraging development of viable
markets for small business loans.95
It is surely no accident that Recommendation No. 5 refers to "vehi-
cles.., to invest in small business." The draftsmen obviously knew that
because of cost, economy of scale, research skills, risk, and availability
of information, individual pension plans were less likely to make direct
investments than to acquire interests in pooled funds with other individ-
ual pension plans. Moreover, such pooled funds would, in turn, not in-
vest in just a single small business, but rather seek to gain the
efficiencies, economies, safeties, and diversification of scale that come
with investments in a balanced group of businesses.
It is important, however, to recognize that while such factors might
affect the prudence of an investment program by lowering the cost and
risk to an individual pension plan, they do not otherwise bear on the
basic issue of this paper. Risk is an important element of any invest-
ment, but risk per se is not a bar. The DOL regulations state explicitly
that "the relative riskiness of a specific investment ... does not render
such investment ... either per se prudent or per se imprudent."96
Under current standards, trustees do not have to justify why they
have chosen to invest in, say, a mutual fund rather than an individual
stock. Whatever biases may have influenced the particular investment, it
is sufficient simply to demonstrate its fitness (that is, its investment
soundness for the particular plan), which means matching the investment
to the unique combination of needs of the pension plan - cash flow,
95 Supra note 92, Reference No. 5, (a).
96 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1979). See also text accompanying note 24.
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interest return, and maturity of benefit claims. Authorizing targeted in-
vestments which still fulfill such plan needs completely would not lessen
the trustees' duty in any way.
Why should an investment in, say, Hong Kong, which anticipates
the better economy when China reestablishes its sovereignty in 1997, be
outside of regulatory inquiry (prudence apart), while an investment in a
Detroit autoparts manufacturer with the object of reestablishing
America's primacy in the international automobile market, or an invest-
ment in a start-up company to help it bring to market a promising inven-
tion, with resultant benefits to its community, be per se prohibited
irrespective of its prudence? Not only does such a policy make no sense;
it is not enforceable. If the government could punish a trustee for its
mens rea, that fiduciary will no doubt leave no traces of its mental
processes and force regulators to plumb that obscure terrain.
XIV. INCENTIVES FOR SUBSIDIZED INVESTMENTS
Can the government devise incentives to induce subsidized commu-
nity investing? Or to direct plan investments towards particular projects,
where the risk/reward ratios are not otherwise "equal or superior" to non-
targeted investments? A plank of the Democratic Platform for the 1992
election advocated "the flow of investment to inner-city development
and housing through targeted enterprise zones and incentives for private
and public pension funds to invest in urban and rural projects." News
accounts early in the Clinton Administration suggested that the success-
ful Democratic Party was now considering this approach, although later
statements by Clintonites withdrew the implication, by emphasizing that
pension plans should always look for "the same risk/return of compara-
ble good investments elsewhere in the economy." 97 The later statements
may have been just punting with the goalposts at their backs.
In his remarks to the trade group,98 Secretary Reich seemed to im-
ply that quantifying the psychic returns that come to participants when
they know they are helping society can offset any economic deficiencies
of a targeted investment. This is not a good suggestion. No one can
devise a satisfactory method for assigning "points" to an investment to
compensate for the loss of a market rate of return - any more than a
formula exists for fixing the fair market value of an investment on any
given day. Only the market has that role.
But what is wrong with providing incentive to make investments
that do not meet the demands of a neutral market place if the pension
funds are in some way made whole? A 1993 recommendation of a Con-
97 B.N.A DAULY ExEcurrvE REP., Mar. 29, 1993, at A-5.
98 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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gressionally chartered body, the Infrastructure Investment Commission,
would establish a government-sponsored corporation, the National Infra-
structure Corp., to attract millions of dollars of investments from pension
funds. It would accomplish its goal by offering insurance protection in
some cases. In other cases it would offer federally guaranteed loans.
Another approach is the bill which Rep. DeLauro (D-Conn.) intro-
duced in 1994. H.R. 5210 would create public benefit "infrastructure
bonds"; pension funds purchasing these bonds could pass through the
return on the bonds tax-free. Still others have suggested "financial engi-
neering" to create sound pension investments through partnerships with
other interested parties who have greater capacity to absorb risks and
who lack the fiduciary constraints of pension trustees. These partner-
ships already occur, for example, when banks make "mezzanine" loans
to large borrowers. Public guaranties of plan benefits which ETI invest-
ments lose (separate from the scheme of guarantie.s which PBGC now
provides99) is another alternative, although we still remember the savings
and loan bailouts too vividly to seriously consider it.
A different approach would be enacting measures of special relief
for the trustees considering making targeted investments. This relief
could simplify the administration of plans, as well as free plan sponsors
from the stringent computational and other testing methodology - as
well as from the penalties which result from inadvertent noncompliance
with other rules. Small business especially would find this freedom ap-
pealing. Further, such an approach would be a step towards simplifying
ERISA. Many have paid lip service to this goal, but only this year, with
enactment of the Small Business Job Protection Act,'00 has there been
even a modest movement in that direction.
The kinds of potential incentives are legion. In his op-ed piece,
Secretary Reich suggested some which might be used to induce corpora-
tions to act socially responsible and held out as a carrot reducing or even
eliminating corporate income taxes for the companies that do. Then he
went past inducements and brandished a club; he suggested that the ben-
efits of incorporation should be withheld from companies acting irre-
sponsibly. Nothing so radical is necessary to induce ETI investments.
Whatever the nature of the incentives, they must not prove too irre-
sistible and deliberately tempt trustees into an investment that is contrary
to the interests of plan participants. The New York City experience tests
the proposition. There the state legislature consciously induced high-risk
investments by authorizing the plan trustees to consider the failing city
finances, and even Congress added inducements in its rescue package.
99 See ERISA Tit. IV.
100 P.L. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
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Arguably, such a case would not fit within the "economically-equal, so-
cially-unequal" formula. What the federal and New York legislatures
were attempting to do - and succeeded in doing, according to the fed-
eral court - was to insulate the trustees and thus induce them to make
an investment which the trustees contended they would not otherwise
have made. But we must recall that in the New York crisis there was a
very strong nexus between the targeted investment and the preservation
of the plans themselves. In those perilous days, many believed that with-
out the loans from the plans, the municipal employees would lose both
their pensions and their livelihoods.
If, however, incentives are to be provided, they should merely as-
sure the payment of plan benefits in somewhat marginal cases, not per-
sonal assurances for the trustees when they make patently improvident
investments. It will not be easy - perhaps impossible - to devise a
general rule which encompasses all the appropriate incentives to induce
the trustees. But are below-market investments proper for pension plans
at all, even where external incentives fully compensate them? Given the
strong opposition to market-rate ETI investments that has surfaced, the
subsidized investment alternative is sure to face even more hostility.
For answers to such questions as whether to provide incentives, and
what kinds of incentives, and under what circumstances, legislation best
deals with these issues. Ideally, the highly qualified members of a blue
ribbon commission would develop such legislation. Preferably, the bal-
anced group would come from government, industry, the consulting
community, and academia, all institutions which can bring to the subject
cumulative experiences and diverse viewpoints, and out of which an in-
formed consensus could emerge. Legislation that such a commission
sponsored would not only be well drafted; it would also have the best
chance of passing.
But whatever legislation may permit trustees to accept incentives to
invest with impunity, it should not be the state's, for this legislation
clearly falls under the preemption rule - even apart from the preemption
rule's role in public pension funds. Besides, attempting to get bills
through all the state legislatures is a slow process. Further, the legisla-
tion will inevitably vary greatly from state to state - not a satisfactory
result where the investments fan across state borders and it is uncertain
what law governs. Federal legislation, then, is clearly the desideratum.
As a matter of policy, of course, states can impose special rules on
private pension plans within their jurisdictions, just as some already have
done in case of public pension funds. States can even act to the point of
requiring that trustees invest minimum amounts of public pension funds
in the investments the state legislatures have designated. But, first, the
federal statutes must change to permit state action. And in order to har-
19961
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monize the special rules of the states, federal law should define the per-
missible parameters for state legislation.
The problem is not just offsetting below-market returns, but even
incentivizing investments showing market returns. Investors - cer-
tainly institutional investors - who traditionally stay within traditional
investment media will probably avoid making investments that involve
high-risk opportunities. In the letter to Rep. Saxton which I cite above,
the writer quoted a 1984 speech given by Robert A. G. Monks, who was
then the Administrator of DOL's Pension and Welfare Benefit Adminis-
tration. He said:
[A trustee] had no financial incentive to achieve superior
results. He minimized possible liability not by taking
chances in the pursuit of profit maximization but by
avoiding errors. He limited his investments to securities,
industries and companies legitimized by other trustees.
A whole class of trustees could hardly be found to have
acted imprudently. Thus, the importance of being where
the rest of the class was (is) one factor driving down
returns for pension funds. 101
XV. DOES MARKET RETURN ASSURE MARKET RESPONSE?
Some commentators argue that market-rate ETIs require no special
consideration to assure adequate investments. If the returns on ETIs are
required to be economically neutral, they argue, the market will find its
way to them and thus eliminate the need for a permissive governmental
posture. 10 2 I beg to differ. The market does not discover all investments,
and the markets do not extend their bounty equally to all investment ve-
hicles, given proper returns. It is therefore a fiction to assume that the
market is uniformly active and efficient.10 3 The best remedy is to permit
investors with special interests to vote with their feet, so to speak, by
deliberately and openly singling out investments which the market would
ignore.
This remedy would work especially for pension plan fiduciaries,
who must meet the commands of ERISA, such as the exclusive benefit
rule. The fiduciaries will less likely make investments in ETIs because
of risk - not in the investment, but to themselves - and such defensive
investing distorts the market drastically for ETI securities. Pension
101 See supra note 30.
102 See, e.g., Phone DOL, supra note 10, at 336. See generally Alicia H. Munnell, The
Pitfalls of Social Investing: The Case of Public Pensions and Housing, New ENGLAND ECON.
Rev. SeptiOct. 1983, at 20.
103 See Phone DOL, supra note 10, at 338.
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funds, after all, probably hold as much as one-third of corporate eq-
uity.104 Assuming that public pensions, which represent between 25 and
30 percent of the pension fund sector,105 have invested in ETIs to a mod-
est extent,106 and also assuming that DOL rules do not directly affect
them, there is still over 70% of pension fund dollars out of ETI play. It is
nothing but a self-defeating prophecy to justify keeping pension funds
out of that market because the market will operate well without them
when it is in fact a vastly different market without these pension funds.
XVI. INVESTMENT VERSUS DISINVESTMENT
So far, this discussion has dealt exclusively with the pros and cons
of selecting investments for their communitarian values. It has not in-
cluded the separate matter of plan fiduciaries blocking out a group of
investments from their screens, or disinvesting, because of perceived
negative social implications: the issuer manufactures an allegedly harm-
ful product (tobacco and alcohol, for example); the issuer employs non-
union labor, discriminates, or supports anti-Israel boycotts. Of course,
not making an investment because of its social implications is the inverse
of an ETI. Different considerations and legal consequences attend the
non-investment, especially where it effectively denies a pension plan rea-
sonable investment alternatives or adequate diversification.10 7
While Langbein and Posner's "uncompensated risk of inadequate
diversification"'108 might be a remote eventuality, we can argue that even
104 See GAO REPORT, supra note 93, at 4; Romano, supra note 31, at 44 (reporting that
pension funds held 26 percent of corporate equity in 1989). Extrapolating the enormous
growth in the intervening six years, the text estimates 33-1/3 percent.
105 The GAO REPORT, supra note 93, puts the number at 23 percent in 1992, while Pro-
fessor Romano, supra note 31, estimates 30 percent in 1989.
106 The conservative estimate is that such investments account for less than five percent
of public pension assets. See The GAO REPORT, supra note 93, at 8 (noting in a 1992 survey
that a group of large public plans had invested approximately 2-1/2 percent of their assets in
ETMs).
107 We can direct fair criticism at programs that deny pension plans investment opportuni-
ties in so many industries that "an optimally diversified portfolio cannot be constructed from
the remainder." DIsINvEsTMENT, supra note 10, at 15. Not uncommonly, collectively bar-
gained plans exclude investments in non-union shops. See DOL Letter, supra note 83 (Depart-
ment approved use of a union-only litmus test on condition that the test did not materially
diminish the plan's investment choices). See also EMPLOYma BmEFrrs LAW 290 (1991). The
statement of the AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCM, GUIDmaINS FOR THE INvEsTMENT OF UNION
PENSION FUNDS (Aug. 18, 1987) demonstrates the bias in favor of the union-made label; it
adjures against the investment of pension funds "in ways that are detrimental to those for
whom they are held in trust," and urges that priority be given, inter alia, to investment in
"union-built construction as well as other programs designed to increase employment[,]...
housing for workers and retirees ... (and) companies which respect employees' rights and
have good records on collective bargaining, occupational health and safety, plant closing and
human rights.' A copy of these "guidelines" is on file with the author.
108 Langbein & Posner, supra note 43, at 88.
350 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
where it is not a factor, there is still a case against economic boycotting
by pension fund trust fiduciaries, at least where there is an act of disin-
vestment. The transaction costs by themselves are too high.
But our case against exclusion could rest on a broader base. In a
speech to the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, a for-
mer administrator of the DOL Office of Pension and Welfare Programs
made the case against exclusion:
[R]uling out certain investments completely, such
as non-union companies or competitors, runs the risk of
violating ERISA. This is because it is difficult to square
an investment policy of exclusion on the basis of non-
objective economic investment criteria, whether the ex-
clusion of union organized companies or non-organized
companies, with ERISA standards that plan assets be
managed prudently, solely in the interest of the partici-
pants, and for the exclusive purpose of paying benefits.
Analysis of these standards, which encompass duties of
care and loyalty, leads to the inescapable conclusion that
any plan which for so-called social purposes excludes
investment possibilities without consideration of their
economic and financial merit is showing insufficient
care for and disloyalty to individuals covered by the
plans. Fiduciaries following such a course would in my
view be acting at their peril.
Anyone interested in "social investing" by funds
would be well advised to forsake a policy of exclusion
and to instead pursue a policy of inclusion. The more
promising approach is to broaden the number and types
of investment vehicles money managers will examine
for investment purposes.10 9
XVII. DO GOOD BUT DO WELL
"Oh, well. You may have lost your pension, but you saved your
city."
109 See Lanoff, supra note 81 (edited version of the Lanoff speech). Arguably, an issue
might also arise under the Sherman antitrust act: A group of pension funds essentially engages
in a boycott by collectively declining investments in protest of the issuer's social policies. The
collective action does resemble businesses refusing to deal for commercial purposes, but joint
activities of pension funds are still probably outside the reach of the Sherman Act - at least
where the pension trusts' "boycott" does not serve commercial interests. For further analysis
of this issue, see BANK, NON-TRADITIONAL INVESTMENT OF PENSION FUNDS - A BRIF OVER-
VIEW OF THE ANTITRUST QUESTION, included in Working Papers of President's Commission on
Pension Policy (Dec. 1980).
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This is no consolation to the retired worker who no longer has a
monthly income. I personally learned this lesson when a retired teacher
named me (he did not name several other federal officials who had an
equal hand in the incident) as the one who approved New York City's
borrowing from his pension fund. Note: The teacher actually did not
lose any money. He just lost sleep from worrying that he might lose his
pension.110
The DOL's IB 94-1 would free pension trustees from the risks of
such an investment, but not free them of the responsibility to act pru-
dently. Under it, merely making an investment because it will build a
bridge would not amount to a per se violation of fiduciary obligations.
That goal is irrelevant because under IB-94, the only question is whether
the investment compromises the return rates and interests of the
pensioners.
"Do good as long as you do well" is the subtext of IB 94-1. It
seemed the right approach to me in 1975, and it still does now. Five
trillion dollars can build a lot of bridges. But this is the downside: There
is a chance that a trustee can compromise the prudence standard. The
trustee is, after all, partial to the collateral benefits of the investment, and
is subject to pressures from public officials and private interest groups.
The DOL has warned in its announcement that endorsing ETIs does not
sanction subordinating the plan's interests. But that warning is easier to
state than follow. Not all trustees will follow it, and there is the rub.
That might be the most troublesome thing about IB 94-1. Only the
most sophisticated pension fiduciary might appreciate that DOL's ap-
proving ETI investments under proper circumstances does not preclude
the DOL - and participants - from challenging those same invest-
ments by DOL itself, where all the other bars to risky investments are not
successfully cleared. Thus, the lulling effect of IB 94-1 might be its most
objectionable feature.
But the DOL will not come after a plan fiduciary first for making an
ETI investment. It will come after the fiduciary for making an imprudent
investment. As with all pension trust investments, the test is not whether
the investment went bad, but whether the trustee exercised the proper
care and diligence when selecting the investment. The "do well" part of
the formula does not require that the investment flourish, but only that
the investor do well in discharging one's selection responsibilities. All
IB 94-1 does, then, is indicate that the DOL is not against the fiduciary's
considering collateral issues in the final selection.
110 Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd,
595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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Professor Zelinsky has credited me for suggesting that collateral
considerations can act as a "tie-breaking criterion." ' I am tempted to
plead nolo contendere, for Professor Zelinsky describes "my suggestion"
so well:
Pension trustees either must use some criterion to select
from among commensurate alternatives or must select
from among such alternatives randomly; ETI-type bene-
fits are as good as any other possible tie-breaking crite-
rion and are more seemly than random selection.11 2
Actually, I do not conceive the process as a tie-breaking mecha-
nism; the investment is already targeted before the fiduciary begins se-
lecting it. The fiduciary's task, rather, is to demonstrate that the choice
of investment does not involve any concessionary sacrifice when it com-
pares it with other comparable investments. Professor Zelinsky writes
that this can be a time-consuming and costly exercise, and his is a fair
comment. So, we should throw those costs on the scale and weigh them
in the balance.
XVIII. CONCLUSION
These are the tough questions: the general issue of societal invest-
ing for pension plans; the standards the trustees must employ (type of
program, portion of plan assets); the appropriate incentives (if, indeed,
any are appropriate) to entice trustees into targeted investments; whether
targeted investing in high risk programs - even with protective devices
and subsidies - is permissible at all no matter how worthy the cause;
and what law (state or federal) should determine these questions.
Five trillion dollars now floats in a pension solution. The spirit of
the Pension Law does not prohibit engaging some of this wealth in the
service of the nation, consistent with the dictates of diversification. It is,
in fact, a worthy goal, and if we can attain it, this goal would elevate
pensions to a new level of service that could create stronger communi-
ties, more successful business, even stronger pensions. And if all the
pension capital of these successful communities and businesses went
back to work to create even more successes, pension funds could become
a potent force in the economy indeed, and a powerful counterbalance to
political lobbying. That is a heady challenge.
But this goal must not compromise or obscure in any way the pri-
mary function of pension plans and the reason they have preferred tax
status in the first place. Tension can exist between the two goals that can
lead to sharp divergences of view, as the radically different viewpoints
111 Phone DOL, supra note 10, at 348 n. 53.
112 Id. at 348.
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between the vice chairman of the Congressional Joint Economic Com-
mittee and the Assistant Secretary of Labor clearly demonstrate, and
even as the more civil exchanges between Professor Zelinsky and myself
demonstrate.
There is no need to rush to a conclusion. Again, a prestigious pub-
lic commission may have the answers. The members of such a body
would be chosen from the government as well as the affected private
communities. It would work outside of the limelight and it would break
ties in a way I can endorse. It offers the best hope for addressing objec-
tively the issues I have raised and for crafting credible solutions, averting
scandals, saving pensions, avoiding future government bailouts. And, fi-
nally, it might spare public officials like I once was from the lawsuits of
insomniac pensioners.

